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the basis of what the firm earned, not merely on what was collected in any
particular year.
The term "net profits" was employed in another context in the agreement.
The partnership agreement established what it labelled a "Participation Sched-
ule." Net profits of the Arm uncollected during any one year were to be dis-
tributed in accordance with this schedule in the year such fees were paid.
However the section referring to this "Participation Schedule" expressly applied
only to those members remaining with the firm, and excluded withdrawing
partners. This would seem to divest plaintiff of his interest in the uncollected
fees, except for a savings clause in the case of withdrawing partners contained
in Article IV of the agreement. This clause provided that in the case of -a
withdrawal of a partner, a prompt estimate be made of the "net profits" of
the firm on the date of withdrawal. The Court pointed out that if the term
"net profits" was meant to include only cash on hand, there would have been
no need of an estimate, for an exact computation would have sufficed.
The Court excluded respondent's argument that "net profits" meant only
cash net profits on hand as of the date of a withdrawal of a partner. If this
argument was sustained, the section containing the Participation Schedule
would have been meaningless.
Other partners in the law firm who retired at the same time as plaintiff
were not deprived of participating in unbilled or uncollected fees of the law
firm. The Court saw no apparent reason to treat plaintiff any differently.
CONTRAcTS or INsURAN cE CONSTrUED AGANST THE INSURER
The problem presented by Sperling. v. Great American Indemnity Com-
pany involves the interpretation of insurance contracts.15 The insured's 16 year
old daughter stole an automobile, with which she negligently injured.the dece-
dent. The daughter was covered by a "Family Automobile Policy'" in her
mother's name, issued by the defendant.
The pertinent parts of the policy in question stated:.
(A) "With respect to the owned automobile . . . provided the actual
use thereof is with the permission of the named insured."
(B) "With respect to a non-owned automobile ... any relative, but
only with respect to a private passenger automobile or trailer
not regularly furnished for the use of such relative.'"lsa
Plaintiff sued the insured in a wrongful death action which the defendant
refused to defend, or to pay the judgment. Plaintiff then sued. the defendant
and was awarded a summary judgment,' 6 from which this appeal was taken.
The defendant claimed that the policy implies that in order for it to be
liable the car must have been "furnished," and that since the accident occurred
15. 7 N.Y.2d 442, 199 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1960).
15a. Id. at 446, 199 N.Y.S2d 468.
16. 8 A.D.2d 986, 191 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1st Dep't 1959).
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during the commission of a crime, public policy will bar a recovery by the
plaintiff. In reality the defendant is asking that the court insert or imply an
additional condition, that the defendant should not be liable for injuries caused
by a stolen car. It is the general rule, however, that if an insurer desires a
specific exclusion from liability, he must expressly include it in the policy.' 7
The court cannot rewrite the policy to add an exclusion which it feels may be
desirable,ls but it will uphold the exclusion if it is expressly included in the
contract. 19 Where the language of the contract is clear, the words used must
be given their usual and actual meaning. 20 Even if there was an ambiguity,
the court would still construe the pertinent clause against the defendant as the
author of the contract.2 '
The New York Court of Appeals has held that the commission of a crime
while driving, which causes an accident to one not involved in the crime, is not
sufficient to relieve liability of the insurer, in a valid insurance contract.22 That
holding, however, involved a misdemeanor and not a felony, as is involved in
the instant case. In accident and life insurance policies the general rule is that
when the insured is killed during the commission of a felony, if the insurer
failed to include a specific exclusion from liability he would be held liable. -2 3
New York, however, has reached an opposite result by holding that the felon
assumed the risk of death, and that to allow the beneficiaries to recover on a
policy which did not specifically assume the risk of felonies would be contrary
to public policy.24 This would seem to lend support to the defendant's argument.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case strictly adhered to the literal
meaning of the insurance contract. It refused to consider the factual circum-
stances involved in the accident when it interpreted the insurance contract.
This resulted in the defendant suffering a loss due to the criminal act of the
insured, which it probably had not contemplated when it made the contract.
Should the court continue to adhere to these strict principles of interpretation,
it will be incumbent upon insurance companies to insert specific exclusions
from coverage in their policies or else bear the losses which may accrue in
similar situations.
In the instant case the defendant insurance company had notice of the
strict rules which are used in the interpretation of insurance contracts. While
the actual situation was one for which there was no precedent, the defendant
knew that it would be held liable for contingencies not expressly excluded by
17. Morgan v. Greater N. Y. Taxpayers Mutual Ins., 305 N.Y. 243, 112 N.E.2d 273
(1953).
18. Taylor v. United States Casualty Co., 269 N.Y. 360, 199 N.E. 620 (1936).
19. Wagener v. Fidelity and Casualty of N. Y., 200 App. Div. 70, 213 N.Y. Supp.
188 (3d Dep't 1926).
20. Gage v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., - Mo. App. -, 273 S.W.2d 761 (1954).
21. Smith v. Mutual Ben. Health and Acc. Assoc., 175 Kan. 68, 259 P.2d 993 (1953).
22. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921).
23. Domico v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 199 Minn. 215, 253 N.W. 538 (1934).
24. Piotrowski v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 172, 252 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct.
1921).
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the policy, including felonies. It would have been possible for the defendant
to have avoided liability, by merely inserting into the policy a clause to the
effect that it would not be liable for damages which occur during the com-
mission of a felony. Certainly this would not have been, nor will the instant
decision in the future place a heavy burden on insurers, who have almost com-
plete control over the conditions upon which they will issue insurance, and
accept liability.
EFFECT OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES' REFUSAL TO PERMIIT PERFORMANCE
In Yorktown Homes Inc. v. County of Westchester,2 5 plaintiff, a builder
and seller of homes, brought suit against defendant County Health Depart-
ment to recover $10,000 which plaintiff had deposited with the department
to guarantee performance of work under a contract with defendant to correct
violations of the Westchester Sanitary Code. The violations concerned the
drainage of surface water and the operation of 'septic tanks in plaintiff's
development. Plaintiff's theory is not that he has fully completed the terms
of the agreement but that performance had been made impossible by the
refusals of the homeowners, who are third-party beneficiaries of the agreement,
to permit him on their lands. The trial court felt that the case presented ques-
tions of fact for the jury as to whether plaintiff made reasonable efforts to
get the consents of the homeowners, and if so, whether their refusals made
performance impossible. The jury answered these questions in the negative,
and thereafter, judgment was entered on the verdict for the defendant. The
Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment.2 6 The Court of
Appeals affirmed,27 holding that the trial judge correctly presented the case to
the jury, and that the verdict was justified by the proof.
There appears to be no dispute on either side as to plaintiff's claim that
the homeowners were third-party beneficiaries of his contract with defendant.
Nor does there appear to be any dispute as to the rule of law relied on by
plaintiff, that when a third-party beneficiary refuses to accept the tendered
benefits, the promisor is excused from performances.28
In Patterson v. Meyerhofer, it was held that "... there is an implied
understanding on the part of each party [to a contract] that he will not
intentionally and purposely do anything to prevent the other party from
carrying out the agreement on his part."29 The majority, for purposes of this
case, assumed that the rule of Patterson v. Meyerhofer applied to hindrance
by one who is not a party to the contract but a third-party beneficiary.30 Al-
though there is no mention of a third-party in the Patterson case, the Court
25. 7 N.Y.2d 321, 197 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1960).
26. 7 A.D.2d 649, 181 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't 1958).
27. Supra note 25.
28. 4 Corbin, -Contracts 237 (1951).
29. 204 N.Y. 96, 100, 97 N.E. 472, 473 (1912).
30. Ibid.
